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I
INTRODUCTION
In the early, heady, halcyon days of the conflict-resolution movement, the
true believers asserted that all conflicts could be resolved through the persistent
application of a rational, constructive mediation process. Some asserted that
mediating with a divorcing couple was ultimately no different than mediating
with warring factions in international disputes or internal civil unrest. That
many of those making such assertions at the time had never mediated in the
context of large-scale, intergroup conflict was not lost on those skeptics who
had. The latter summarily dismissed the bold assertions of the former, and the
field of conflict resolution has since evolved into two primary camps, one
concerning itself primarily with interpersonal, dyadic disputes and the other
focusing on intergroup conflicts of various scales.1 The field is palpably divided
between those who work with individuals in conflict and those who work with
groups in conflict. This symposium challenges us to bridge that divide because,
although the symposium’s focus is on group-conflict resolution, the emotions
and behaviors associated with apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation are
experienced at a deeply personal and individual level.
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1. The former might be categorized as part of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
movement, and the latter are more likely to identify with the peace or peacemaking movement. Of
course, the development of the field is a more complex story. Indeed, many practitioners do both
interpersonal and intergroup work. In addition, some practitioners who engage in intergroup work,
such as those who do environmental and public-policy consensus-building or work as diplomats, are
unlikely to identify themselves with the individuals and NGOs who consider themselves part of the
peace movement.
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This article takes up the challenge by introducing a biological approach to
understanding resistance to apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation in
intergroup conflict. To start with, reconciliation takes place at the level of the
individual. To understand resistance to group reconciliation, one must
understand why individuals resist reconciliation. In turn, one must understand
how membership in the group affects individual resistance. This article first
examines the behaviors that promote or discourage reconciliation. Using
evolutionary biology and game theory, we illustrate how the strategic dynamics
of dyadic interaction tend to favor these behaviors and derive a schema relevant
to a reconciliatory cycle. We then explore how the distinct context of intra- and
intergroup conflict reinforces these behaviors. Finally, we identify those barriers
to individual reconciliation that result from the strategic dynamics of socialgroup architectures, particularly those that differ from the ancestral social
architecture within which individual behavior has evolved. We conclude with a
brief application of this conceptual approach to truth and reconciliation
commissions.
II
WHAT IS RECONCILIATION?
Reconciliation is the Holy Grail of conflict resolution. Specifically, it refers
to the restoration of a preexisting cooperative relationship after estrangement.2
Reconciliation among those who have had a relationship is important for the
simple reason that we fight more amongst ourselves than with others. That is to
say, we have more conflicts within social groups3 than between groups, and
resolving those conflicts is essential for the survival of the group. Ostensibly,
some benefits to be gained in the group relationship cannot be more easily
gained outside of it; however, the increased interaction of individuals within a
group leads to more situations in which conflict can arise. Thus, we are more
likely to have disputes with our spouses, our children, our siblings, our parents,
our friends, our neighbors, and our colleagues than with strangers. Conflict is
unavoidable in these relationships and, if left unresolved, it has the potential to
tear them apart with the concomitant loss in the benefits of cooperation.
Reconciliation is how we preserve and repair cooperative relationships in the
face of our disputing.

2. In this sense, it is distinguishable from a mere resolution or settlement. Both resolution and
settlement do not necessarily entail the end of a dispute or of the underlying conflict. See DOUGLAS H.
YARN, DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 375, 380, 392 (1999) (defining reconciliation as
“[r]enewal of applicable relations between persons who have been at variance,” resolution as
“[s]olution or the act of solving,” and settlement as “[a]greement or arrangement ending a dispute”). In
animal behavior, reconciliation refers to friendly reunions between former opponents and implies a
behavior that serves the function of restoring social relationships and reducing social tension due to
aggressive incidences. See NATURAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 397 (Filippo Aureli & Frans B.M. de
Waal eds., 2000).
3. For our purposes, a social group is simply two or more individuals in a cooperative relationship.

06_YARN & JONES_FINAL.DOC

Spring 2009]

9/18/2009 11:06:55 AM

UNDERSTANDING RESISTANCE

65

More broadly, reconciliation refers to the establishment of cooperative
relations between persons, either individuals or groups, who have been at
variance without regard to whether they have had a prior cooperative
relationship.4 As strangers encounter one another and come into conflict in
pursuit of their own interests, they can choose to either compete or cooperate.
If they initially compete and find the costs unacceptable, they can either
disengage or attempt to form a cooperative relationship. Conflict-resolution
practitioners commonly refer to such a transition from competition to
cooperation—particularly in the context of large-scale, intergroup conflict—as
reconciliation. It encompasses a variety of interventions meant to transform a
temporary peace into a stable or permanent peace in which the parties
cooperate or at least tolerate one another. 5 The most notable
institutionalization of these interventions is the truth and reconciliation
commission.6 Most of these interventions are broadly influenced by concepts of
restorative justice, which focuses on the effect of an offense on individuals
rather than on the state in an attempt to promote the restoration of
interpersonal relationships.7 Consistent with the restorative-justice philosophy,
reconciliation efforts tend to operate at the individual level by addressing such
human emotions as fear, anger, and distrust.8 Indeed, such emotions express the

4. Morton Deutsch, Justice and Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 41, 61
(Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000).
5. See generally JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN
DIVIDED SOCIETIES (1997).
6. Truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) are organizations designed to investigate alleged
human-rights violations in a particular locale in an attempt to resolve longstanding intergroup conflict
so as to enable future peace. See generally PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to
1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597 (1994). The most famous commission was
undoubtedly South Africa’s TRC. Organized in 1995, the TRC was a court-like body that attempted to
ease South Africa’s transition to democracy by holding hearings into the human-rights abuses of
apartheid. For an overview, see ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA'S
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (2001).
7. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION
(2002). For a theoretical defense of restorative justice and a comparison to traditional theories of
punishment, see Zvi D. Gabbay, Justifying Restorative Justice: A Theoretical Justification for the Use of
Restorative Justice Practices, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 349 (2005). For a proposal that elements of
restorative justice should be implemented into American criminal procedure, see Stephanos Bibas &
Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85
(2004).
8. According to Haas,
There is at least one common denominator to all these approaches to reconciliation. They all
are designed to lead individual men and women to change the way they think about their historical adversaries. As a result, reconciliation occurs one person at a time and is normally a
long and laborious process.
Charles Haas, Reconciliation, in BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (Guy Burgess & Heidi Burgess eds., 2003),
available at http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/reconciliation/?nid=1224. Lederach describes the
goal as “building and healing the torn fabric of interpersonal and community lives and relationships.”
John Paul Lederach, Civil Society and Reconciliation, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF
MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 841, 842 (Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela
Aall eds., 2001) (emphasis added).
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underlying sources of resistance to reconciliation, and evolutionary biology
offers an explanation of why humans experience them.
III
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AND THE RECONCILIATORY CYCLE
Emotions are biological. We experience an emotion when the brain
responds to stimuli and, in turn, produces neurochemicals triggering a
physiological response that we associate with a particular behavior, experience,
or activity.9 The human brain has been shaped by evolutionary forces producing
a species-typical brain 10 that produces species-typical behavioral outputs in
response to various stimuli. As the terms are used in biology, the proximate
cause of an emotion is the brain’s response to the stimuli, whereas the ultimate
cause of an emotion can be traced to the evolutionary forces that shaped the
human brain to so respond.11 Those forces were the basic challenges of survival
in the environment in which our current species-typical brain evolved.
Biologists refer to these challenges as the environment of evolutionary
adaptedness (EEA). 12 The EEA consists of both physical and social
environments, the essential challenges of which consisted of food choice
(eating), predator avoidance (survival), and mate selection (reproduction). If a
given behavior is common for humans today, then the predisposition to so
behave may have enhanced survival and reproduction over time in the EEA
and, as a result, became “hard-wired” in our brains through natural selection.13
The social challenges of the EEA are particularly germane to the problem
of reconciliation. Humans are highly social animals. Living in groups was crucial
to our ancestors’ survival. In the EEA, social-group formation was a
9. A tremendous number of theoretical perspectives on emotions have emerged in various fields
over the course of time. See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion,
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Spring 2009). The perspective adopted by Bandes most nearly reflects
a neurobiological theory with an evolutionary perspective. For a useful overview of the neurobiological
theory of emotion, see JOSEPH E. LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS
UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE (1996).
10. Each individual’s unique psychological profile results from a combination of species-typical
brain, other inherited characteristics, and the effects of experience and environment on the brain. See
John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in THE ADAPTED MIND:
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 19, 68 (Jerome H. Barkow, Leda
Cosmides & John Tooby eds., 1995).
11. For an exploration of the proximate and ultimate causes of empathy, see generally Stephanie
D. Preston & Frans B.M. de Waal, Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate Bases, 25 BEHAV. & BRAIN
SCI. 1 (2002).
12. This term was coined by John Bowlby in reference to his work in attachment theory. JOHN
BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT (2d ed. 1999).
13. This is a fundamental principle of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary biologists generally
recognize an architectural element of an organism as a presumptive adaptation when “it solves an
adaptive problem with ‘reliability, efficiency, and economy.’” Leda Cosmides & John Tooby,
Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer (1997), http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html. For
many biologists and evolutionary psychologists, “hard-wired” may be too strong a term to describe an
inherited behavioral predisposition from which individuals can vary and are not predestined to behave.
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cooperative behavior that improved our ancestors’ ability to warn of and fight
off predators and to find food and mates.14 With social living, however, came
conflict and competition over resources. From a biological perspective,
competitive behavior is hardly surprising, for purely selfish or self-regarding
behavior would certainly seem to enhance reproduction and the survivability of
one’s genes in a world of scarce resources. But constant competition and
conflict among all group members would quickly erode social cohesion. The
adaptive way to deal with conspecific conflict (conflict within a species), and
thereby to maintain the benefits of group living, was to form cooperative
friendships, alliances, and coalitions. This required some level of seemingly
altruistic behavior that enhanced the reproductive fitness of others at an
apparent cost to the actor. Such cooperative, altruistic behavior among kin
makes biological sense and is common among animals—the closer the kin, the
more shared genes.15 Altruistic behavior toward non-kin is also common among
social animals and has been explained by the notion of direct reciprocity—by
helping B today, A expects B to reciprocate tomorrow.16 But there is a critical
tension between cooperative, altruistic behavior and competitive behavior—
how does A trust B to behave fairly? While it is our nature to cooperate, it is
also our nature to “cheat” and take advantage of others’ tendencies to
cooperate because the competitive “selfish gene”17 tempts B to defect and
merely free ride (gain the benefits of cooperation without the costs). The result
is a fundamental social dilemma: How does one determine whom to trust,
whether one has been treated fairly, and what to do when cheated?
Game theory reveals a partial solution through the iterated, prisoners’
dilemma game,18 in which a reciprocating strategy of tit-for-tat reduces cheating
and encourages cooperation. In a tit-for-tat strategy, one’s first move is
cooperative, while successive moves mimic those of the other player. If he

14. See ROBERT L. BETTINGER, HUNTER-GATHERERS: ARCHEOLOGICAL AND EVOLUTIONARY
THEORY 158 (1991) (hunting efficiency); ROGER LEWIN & ROBERT A. FOLEY, PRINCIPLES OF
HUMAN EVOLUTION 168 (2004) (noting that social-group formation served as a defense against
predation). See generally DAVID BUSS, THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MIND (2003) (detailing socialbehavior adaptations to the various challenges and problems present in the EEA).
15. See W.D. Hamilton, The Genetic Evolution of Social Behaviour I, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
1 (1964) (laying out a precise mathematical formulation of the tendency for altruistic behavior as a
function of the percentage of genes shared). This is generally referred to as “inclusive fitness.”
16. Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35, 35 (1971).
17. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 4–12 (1976).
18. The classical formulation of the prisoners’ dilemma game is as follows: Two suspected
criminals, A and B, are arrested. The District Attorney lacks sufficient evidence for a conviction, so she
visits each of the suspects separately to offer the same deal: if one testifies for the prosecution against
the other and the other remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice is sentenced to
five years in jail. If both remain silent, both are sentenced to two years in jail. If each betrays the other,
each is sentenced to four years in jail. Since the prisoners are unable to communicate with each other,
how should they act? For a historical overview of the prisoners’ dilemma, see WILLIAM POUNDSTONE,
PRISONER’S DILEMMA (1992). In the iterated prisoners’ dilemma, two players repeat the game, thereby
enabling a range of new behavior. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION (1984).
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cooperated, you cooperate, and if he defected, you defect. In other words, titfor-tat entails behavior that is initially trusting, rewards cooperation with
continued cooperation (positive reciprocity), and punishes cheating with
defection (negative reciprocity). By punishing defection, the strategy
encourages cooperation. The primary pitfall of a pure tit-for-tat strategy is that
players can get trapped in a cycle of negative reciprocity. 19 Research
demonstrates, however, that a player can break this costly cycle by randomly
making an occasional, cooperative move in response to a defection.20 This is
roughly akin to random “forgiveness.” Ultimately, this modification from pure
tit-for-tat proves a more successful overall strategy.21
From an evolutionary point of view, individuals whose behavioral
tendencies matched this modified tit-for-tat strategy in the EEA would have
been more successful in eliciting cooperation from others and therefore more
likely to survive, reproduce, and have descendents than those whose did not. As
a result of this ultimate, or evolutionary, cause, modern homo sapiens tends to
behave as if engaging in a tit-for-tat strategy: we are initially trusting and
cooperative; we have the mental capacity to keep track of exchanges and to
judge their fairness; we remember defectors and have a strong emotional urge
to retaliate; and we are capable, if not prone, to forgive and resume relations,
provided the relationship is important and that sufficient trust is reestablished.
A growing body of scientific research is uncovering reconciliatory behaviors in
other social animals22 and tracing the physiological correlates, or proximate
19. Negative reciprocity also may carry certain associated costs. See Douglas H. Yarn & Gregory
Todd Jones, In Our Bones (or Brains): Behavioral Biology, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK: THE
DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 283, 287 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider &
Christopher Honeyman eds., 2007) (“In dynamic environments where responses to social norms are in
flux, decisions to punish may not only be costly in and of themselves, but may carry steep opportunity
costs associated with failing to cooperate with a previous defector who has newly decided to
cooperate.”).
20. Computer simulations conducted in the Computational Laboratory for Complex Adaptive
Systems at the Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution have shown that game-theoretic
strategies employing forgiving, or generous strategies, defined by continuing to cooperate to some
extent, even in the face of defection, are evolutionarily successful strategies. Research results are on file
with the authors. See generally The Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Nexus—The
Biology of Conflict Resolution, http://www.cncrnet.org/nexus/research.html (last visited May 27, 2009).
21. Id.
22. Other social primates engage in conciliatory and consolation behaviors to restore important
relationships after fights and other aggression. See, e.g., Josep Call, Filippo Aureli & Frans B.M. de
Waal, Reconciliation Patterns Among Stumptail Macaques: A Multivariate Approach, 58 ANIMAL
BEHAV. 165 (1999); Frans B.M. de Waal, Primates: A Natural Heritage of Conflict Resolution, 289
SCIENCE 586 (2000) (primates generally); Frans B.M. de Waal, Reconciliation Among Primates: A
Review of Empirical Evidence and Unresolved Issues, in PRIMATE SOCIAL CONFLICT 111 (William A.
Mason & Sally P. Mendoza eds., 1993) (primates generally); Frans B.M. de Waal & Jennifer J.
Pokorny, Primate Conflict Resolution and Its Relation to Human Forgiveness, in HANDBOOK OF
FORGIVENESS 17 (Everett L. Worthington Jr. ed., 2005) (primates); Frans B.M. de Waal & Angeline
van Roosmalen, Reconciliation and Consolation Among Chimpanzees, 5 BEHAV. ECOLOGY &
SOCIOBIOLOGY 55 (1979) (chimpanzees). See generally NATURAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Filippo
Aureli & Frans B.M. de Waal eds., 2000) (primates generally). These behaviors may be evolutionary
antecedents of the human behaviors associated with seeking and granting forgiveness.
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causes, of trust, fairness, vengefulness, and forgiveness. 23 Together, these
tendencies constitute a behavioral cycle of reconciliation conceptualized in the
following schema:

Figure 1: The Reconciliatory Cycle24
This schema describes the behaviors associated with cooperation, conflict,
and its resolution. Conflict occurs when a party perceives through its sense of
fairness that another party has violated expected norms of behavior, thereby
breaching the trust between them. The party that sees itself as injured by the
violation can punish, forgive, or do both. This party can resume cooperative or
tolerant relations, or not, depending upon the satisfaction of retaliatory urges,
sufficient trust, and the level of interdependence (including benefits of
cooperation). The converse (in which retaliatory urges are not satisfied, there is

23. Social psychologists assert that forgiveness is related to empathy. For a good summary of this
relationship, see Loren Toussaint & Jon R. Webb, Gender Differences in the Relationship Between
Empathy and Forgiveness, 145 J. SOC. PSYCH. 673 (2005). Recent investigations of the functional
neuroanatomy associated with empathy and forgiveness show, however, that they are distinct.
Researchers in the United Kingdom used functional magnetic-resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine
the neural correlates of making empathic and forgivability judgments. Tom F.D. Farrow et al.,
Investigating the Functional Anatomy of Empathy and Forgiveness, 12 NEUROREPORT 2433 (2001).
These results suggest that “attempting to understand others is physiologically distinct from determining
the forgivability of their actions.” Id. at 2435. Although the two types of judgments shared activations in
some areas of the brain, including the left frontal cortex, activation of the posterior cingulate gyrus was
unique to forgiveness judgments. Id. This is a region that has been associated with decisionmaking,
attentional tasks, and problem-solving, including an awareness that other people may hold views
distinct from our own. Id. There seems to be a biological explanation for why we can put ourselves in
another person’s shoes without necessarily being able to forgive them.
24. For full-color illustrations and more-detailed supplemental material, see http://www.
cncrnet.org/nexus/yarnandjoneslcpsupplemental.pdf.
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insufficient trust, or the level of interdependence is weak) and the emotions
associated with it create resistance to reconciliation among individuals in dyadic
conflict.
The reconciliatory cycle depicts only the behavioral mechanisms of the
injured party; however, the offender’s behavior is equally relevant, not only to
trigger retaliation but also to hasten forgiveness. The evolution of apologetic
behavior makes sense in light of this scenario. Some way of hastening
forgiveness would be to the advantage of a target of retaliation. Social signals
that sufficiently assure the vengeful party that the offender will not repeat the
offending behavior can mitigate the costs of retaliation to both parties and can
lead toward reconciliation. 25 But the resumption of cooperative relations
requires the resumption of trust. Thus, the ability both to make a sincere
apology and to gauge its sincerity is crucial. Absent perception of an apology
that sufficiently signals the future trustworthiness of the offender, the aggrieved
party would resist reconciliation. Moreover, the offender’s sense of fairness can
also come into play in judging the fairness of the punishment: a punishment that
the offender perceives as unfair may invoke retaliatory urges, mistrust, and
resistance to cooperation, leading to an ongoing cycle of negative reciprocity.
IV
RESISTANCE TO RECONCILIATION IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERGROUP
CONFLICT
By definition, the social behaviors that constitute the reconciliatory cycle
are behaviors that evolved in social groups. They work most efficiently in the
context of intragroup conflict, in which the victim and the offender are
members of so-called in-groups.26 Fairness and cheating are best understood
through the norms of in-group interaction. The opportunity for repeat

25. Recent theoretical scholarship suggests that apologetic behavior evolved for this purpose. See
Erin Ann O’Hara, Apology and Thick Trust: What Spouse Abusers and Negligent Doctors Have in
Common, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1066–67 (2004) (“Individuals who develop the emotional
framework necessary for the effective use of apology and forgiveness are thus placed at a competitive
advantage relative to those individuals who must incur the full costs of moralistic aggression.”); Erin
Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1147–53 (2002).
Computational studies recently performed at the Primate Research Institute at Kyoto University in
Japan suggest that apology can play a role similar to altruistic punishment as a means of maintaining
cooperation, as long as the apology, which signals a willingness to conform to social norms in the future,
is sufficiently costly. Kyoko Okamoto & Shuichi Matsumura, The Evolution of Punishment and
Apology: An Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Model, 14 EVOLUTIONARY ECOLOGY 703, 713–15 (2000).
26. An in-group is a social group with which an individual identifies as a member and expresses a
bias in favor of other members. In contrast, individuals are negatively biased toward others who are
members of an out-group. The terms are identified with social-identity theory and are commonly used
in sociology. See generally Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel
eds., 1979) (social-identity theory). The terms may have originated with William Graham Sumner, who
coined the term “ethnocentrism.” WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE
SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS 13 (1906).
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interaction, both positive (cooperation) and negative (retaliation), is greater
within a social group. The need to resume cooperative relations with fellow
group members is greater than the need to do so with those outside the group,
thereby encouraging apologetic and forgiving behaviors among group members.
In the context of the social group, costly retaliation by an individual—costly in
the sense that the individual benefit is exceeded by the individual cost to the
retaliating party—is a social good benefiting the entire group. In addition,
retaliation serves as “face-saving” behavior, signaling to all group members the
victim’s level of resistance to further victimization by any other group member.
Signaling and communication of emotion are social skills that evolved in
tandem with the requisite cognitive abilities to interpret and respond to the
signals.27 In this context, social anthropoids are emotionally contagious.28 The
emotions displayed in an interpersonal, dyadic conflict engage the entire group,
thereby inviting support from other in-group members.
Evolution of these behaviors and our brains took place in an ancestral social
environment initially consisting of small, stable bands of highly interdependent
and closely related individuals that would temporarily split into sub-bands.29
Although members of the in-group were subject to strategic pressures to
cooperate, out-group members were not subject to the same pressures and were
therefore more likely to successfully cheat. This made the cognitive capacity to
distinguish in-group from out-group members and the differential treatment of
them (prejudice) adaptive traits. Prejudicial and xenophobic behavior—for
example, fear and distrust of strangers—is shared by most social primate
species, suggesting that it was inherited through our common ancestry. 30
Xenophobia is also demonstrated by intergroup conflict, primarily in the form
of lethal raiding. 31 Intergroup conflict was exacerbated by bipedalism and

27. See generally JONATHAN H. TURNER, ON THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN EMOTIONS: A
SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN AFFECT (2000).
28. See FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS
AND OTHER ANIMALS 69–70 (1997).
29. See generally DEAN FALK, PRIMATE DIVERSITY (2000).
30. Chimpanzees are territorial and attack male out-group members who wander into the ingroup’s home range. Additionally, they patrol the edges of the group range. See generally RICHARD
WRANGHAM & DALE PETERSON, DEMONIC MALES: APES AND THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN VIOLENCE
(1996). For comparisons with so-called primitive human society, see Christopher Boehm, Segmentary
‘Warfare’ and the Management of Conflict: Comparisons of East African Chimpanzees and Patrilineal–
Patrilocal Humans, in COALITIONS AND ALLIANCES IN HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS 136
(Alexander H. Harcourt & Frans B.M. de Waal eds., 1992). For a discussion of the evolutionary
foundations of learning mechanisms leading to fear of out-group members, see Terry A. Maroney,
Unlearning Fear of Out-Group Others, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Spring 2009).
31. For a good overview of the evolution of tribalism and warfare, see MATT RIDLEY, THE
ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 150–93 (1996). The
relationship between feelings toward members of one’s own group and those toward those in the outgroup are not necessarily directly related. That is, affiliative feelings toward one do not create hostility
toward the other. See Marilynn B. Brewer, The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup
Hate?, 55 J. SOC. ISSUES 429 (1999) (A preference for members of the in-group, rather than direct
animus toward an out-group, motivates discrimination against the out-group.).
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upright walking, which allowed our ancestors to forage over a larger range,
supporting the formation of bigger groups.32 The formation of larger groups also
provided better protection from predators, including other humanoids.
Ironically, social and competitive pressures within large groups also encouraged
continuous division into additional small, more-manageable groups. 33 More
groups equals more boundaries between territories and, in a xenophobic
species, more intergroup conflict. Larger groups trump smaller groups in
intergroup conflict, so selective pressures favored the social–emotional
repertoire needed to form and maintain larger groups and to motivate them
through emotional contagion to defend and attack.34 As a result, humans have
the tendency to be cooperative and tolerant toward in-group members while
hostile and intolerant toward out-group members.35
The selective pressures toward larger-group formation, together with the
increasing probability of conflict with members of out-groups, also favored the
cognitive ability to manage group boundaries. Groups can grow either by
increasing reproduction or by inducting individuals from outside the group.
Although some transfer between groups is necessary to prevent inbreeding,
there was a strong incentive to assimilate non-kin males who could help deter
attack and take territory.36 Assimilation carried the risk of increased intragroup
conflict; therefore, in-group members had to be discriminating as to which
individuals to induct. Combined with the problem of distinguishing friend from
foe in a larger group consisting of less-closely related individuals, assimilation
created evolutionary pressure on the cognitive capacity both to recognize
insiders from outsiders, and to tolerate insiders but reject outsiders.
In this way, evolved reconciliatory behavior favoring social cooperation
helped define groups, favored xenophobia, and promoted intergroup conflict.

32. Michael J. Lovaglia, Chana Barron & Jeffrey Houser, Social Development and Human
Evolution: Managing the Ingroup Boundary 5 (Jan. 31, 2003) (unpublished presentation to the Theory
Workshop, Dep’t of Sociology, Univ. of Iowa) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems).
33. Id. at 5.
34. See TURNER, supra note 27, at 30–34.
35. See generally THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM: EVOLUTIONARY DIMENSIONS OF
XENOPHOBIA, DISCRIMINATION, RACISM, AND NATIONALISM (Vernon Reynolds, Vincent Falger &
Ian Vine eds., 1987). GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954) is considered the
seminal work on prejudice by most psychologists and sociologists but lacks reference to evolution.
Similarly, much of the more influential social-psychology theories on prejudice and stereotyping lack an
evolutionary perspective. See, e.g., Alice H. Eagly & Valerie J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes Stem from
the Distribution of Women and Men into Social Roles, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 735 (1984)
(“social role theory” of stereotyping); Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of
Racism, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM 61 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner,
eds., 1986) (“aversive racism” theory); David L. Hamilton & Robert K. Gifford, Illusory Correlation in
Interpersonal Perception: A Cognitive Basis of Stereotypic Judgments, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCH. 392 (1976) (“illusory correlation” theory of stereotyping); Tajfel & Turner, supra note 26, at 33
(“social identity” theory alternative to Allport). More recently, some social psychologists are
integrating evolutionary explanations into their work. See, e.g., HAROLD D. FISHBEIN, THE ORIGINS
OF PREJUDICE 39–80 (2002).
36. Lovaglia, Barron & Houser, supra note 32, at 8.
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In turn, intergroup conflict created more selective pressures favoring the
cognitive ability to discriminate, socially cohesive behaviors toward members of
the in-group, and hostile behaviors toward members of the out-group.
Therefore, intergroup conflict involved an additional layer of resistance to
apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation that could be summarized as inherent
prejudicial behavior expressed by fear, distrust, and hostility toward out-group
members.
V
RESISTANCE TO RECONCILIATION IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN SOCIAL
NETWORKS
Up to this point, this article has focused on how the strategic dynamics of
dyadic interaction underlie the ultimate and proximate biological causes of an
individual’s tendency to resist reconciliation and cooperation generally. The
tendency to resist can be compounded by two additional levels of strategic
dynamics: (1) the strategic dynamics of interaction in triads or larger groups,
which become quite complicated very quickly due to the possibility of
coalitions; and, perhaps more subtly, (2) the population-level dynamics of local
interactions that arise as a result of these interactions taking place within
specific social architectures. These population-level effects may result from
interactions that take place in a dyad or a larger group, but the effects are
independent from the game-theoretic, strategic decisionmaking that provides
the customary frame for thinking about cooperative interaction. Both the
strategic dynamics of large-group interaction and the dynamics related to social
architecture are properly thought of as sources of barriers to large-group
cooperation. But given the long-standing problems of tractability faced by
theories of social choice in groups larger than two, we focus here on the
structural dynamics that influence dyadic interactions in larger groups.37
A. Characteristic Social Architecture
The evolved tendency to resist reconciliation in intergroup conflict is
complicated by more-recent changes in social-group architecture. Modern
homo sapiens appeared, approximately 100,000 years ago, during the
Pleistocene.38 Because the Pleistocene ended only 12,000 years ago, most human
37. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951) (laying
out modern social-choice theory and showing that no social-choice rules exist to produce stable
outcomes in large groups); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (laying out publicchoice theory and the frailties of decisionmaking in large groups); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (demonstrating that
even where members of large groups share common interests, concerted, collective action cannot be
assumed). For a recent attempt to reconcile rational-choice and structural conceptions, see LUIS
FERNANDO MEDINA, A UNIFIED THEORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE (2007).
38. Vinayak Eswaran, Henry Harpending & Alan R. Rogers, Genomics Refutes an Exclusively
African Origin of Humans, 49 J. HUMAN EVOLUTION 1, 1–2 (2005).
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psychological mechanisms are adapted to challenges encountered in Pleistocene
environments described above;39 that is, our brains are much as they were then.
Twelve thousand years in evolutionary terms is just a blink of the eye, offering
little time for natural selection to further evolve our brains so as to significantly
change behavioral tendencies. The social environment in which we now live,
however, has changed dramatically in this time period. With the technological
development of agriculture, it became possible to live in much larger groups
and stay in one place. Instead of occasionally competing groups of comparably
small bands of related individuals, large urban populations coordinate vastly
diverse activities supported by evolving cultural institutions, such as the rule of
law. Individuals are less reliant on an immediate, homogeneous, and
geographically bounded social network. Today, it is relatively easy to travel,
communicate, and form cooperative relationships outside such a community.
The dramatically increasing importance of the Internet is possibly hastening this
trend by replacing small, regularly-connected social networks of the EEA with
extremely large, scale-free networks. The result: few individuals will remain
highly connected, but the vast majority of individuals will lead largely
unconnected, anonymous lives.

A

B

Figure 2: A: A regularly connected, degree-homogeneous network
representative of what may have been typical of the EEA. B: A scale-free,
degree-heterogeneous network representative of the modern age. 40 For
illustrative purposes, the structure of the network and explicitly not the group
size is representative.
Social architecture matters. Average degree (the number of connections an
individual shares with others in the social network) and heterogeneity of
degree, for example, can have dramatic effects on the prevalence of pro-social

39. See generally Donald Symons, On the Use and Misuse of Darwinism in the Study of Human
Behavior, in THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF
CULTURE, supra note 10, at 137–59. The important point is not the precise point in history at which our
brain evolved, but that the environment in which it evolved is different than the environment of today.
40. For full-color illustrations and more-detailed supplemental material, see http://www.cncrnet.
org/nexus/yarnandjoneslcpsupplemental.pdf.
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behavior in large groups. Our research on evolutionary dynamics in networks
demonstrates that a certain level of degree is necessary for reciprocal
cooperation to arise, but that when degree becomes large relative to population
size, such reciprocity suffers.41 Further, our simulations show that reciprocal
strategies that promote cooperation in the degree-homogeneous, regularly
connected social networks typical of the EEA are not as successful in
promoting cooperation in the degree-heterogeneous networks of the modern
age.42 In short, we have a Paleolithic mind in a postmodern age, and behavior
that seems irrational in the present environment may be perfectly rational when
considered in the context of the EEA. This mismatch between our ancestral,
evolved brains and the present-day environment may explain the various
heuristics, biases, and emotions that seem to depart irrationally from the model
of homo economicus decisionmaking. Emotional contagion is less effective
across a larger, less-interconnected social network. And there may be other
structural factors than can be identified.43 So, particular social structures that
deviate significantly from social structures of the EEA can be barriers to
effective group cooperation.
B. Integration
One well-studied question of social structure44 is the extent to which efforts
at integration reduce prejudicial behavior. It has been noted that with
intergroup conflict, the action happens on the borders.45 More nuanced is the
idea that the structure of the borders themselves matters. Recent models
attempting to predict civil violence using agent-based network models have
demonstrated that there is little conflict with full segregation and little conflict
with full integration—it is in intermediate stages, where there is a critical mass
of in-group–out-group behavior, that conflict arises. 46 Our recent work
subjecting the contact hypothesis to varying levels of integration has produced

41. Our current work explores the relationship of local clustering to average degree and
heterogeneity of degree in the promotion of cooperation. Gregory Todd Jones, Douglas H. Yarn,
Reidar Hagtvedt & Travis Lloyd, Homogeneity of Degree in Complex Social Networks as a Collective
Good, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 931 (2008).
42. It may not be particularly surprising that high average degree is harmful to cooperation, given
that it is well known that fully connected “mean field” simulations lead to pure defection when
evolutionary replication dynamics are at play. Id. A particularly important finding of our work is that
heterogeneity of degree exerts an influence on cooperation that is statistically distinct from average
degree. Id.
43. Id.
44. This question was developed in Allport’s contact hypothesis. See ALLPORT, supra note 35. It
was made famous by Shellling’s models of segregation. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES
AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978).
45. See supra note 44; infra note 46.
46. See May Lim, Richard Metzler & Yaneer Bar-Yam, Global Pattern Formation and
Ethnic/Cultural Violence, 317 SCIENCE 1540, 1542 (2007) (identifying a process of global pattern
formation in which violence occurs at the boundaries of regions differentiated by culture).
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similar results.47 At levels approaching full segregation, prejudicial strategies
(wherein individuals behave reciprocally with members of their own group, but
always defect against members of other groups) suffer no particular
disadvantage given that there is no one to act prejudicially against. At levels
approaching full integration, prejudicial strategies are driven to extinction and
social welfare is maximized. However, at intermediate levels of integration,
prejudicial strategies are more successful than nonprejudicial strategies, and
cooperation, along with social welfare, suffers. So certain intermediate levels of
integration could exacerbate resistance to reconciliation and effective
cooperation.
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Figure 3: The evolutionary success of prejudicial strategies as a percentage
of the population (Prejudice) and social welfare measured as cooperative
48
interactions as a percentage of overall interactions (Cooperation).
C. Nonlinear Participation Effects
Social dynamics are often nonlinear. Consider the example of critical mass:
At the end of a particularly moving speech or musical performance, a few
people will come to their feet during the applause, followed by a few more, and
then, with the addition of only one other individual, a threshold is reached that
brings the entire audience to its feet.49 Even after continued efforts to involve as
47. Our work investigates the robustness of the contact hypothesis when subjected to various
spatial conditions. Results of computer simulations show a nonlinear relationship between integration
policy and the success of prejudicial strategies. Small modifications to interventions can therefore have
disproportionate effects on prejudicial behavior.
48. For full-color illustrations and more-detailed supplemental material, see http://www.cncrnet.
org/nexus/yarnandjoneslcpsupplemental.pdf.
49. An atomic pile ‘goes critical’ when a chain reaction of nuclear fission becomes self-sustaining;
for an atomic pile, or an atomic bomb, there is some minimum amount of fissionable material that
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many individuals as possible, the addition of one more individual, or a small
group of individuals, can cause a cascade, or a threshold effect, that brings
about a phase transition50 resulting in large-scale collective action. This also
involves emotional contagion. Our simulations show that the addition of a
single relationship or the conversion of a single agent can cause network effects
that transform the entire population.51 So, Herculean efforts directed at a high
threshold may offer no results, whereas very small efforts can bring about
system-wide change if the threshold is low. The mistaken impression that efforts
toward reconciliation and cooperation in large groups produce linear results can
be a significant barrier to the success of these efforts.
D. Institutional Design
As important as recognizing the nonlinearity of social dynamics is
recognizing that specific individuals may be more likely to bring about a
cascade of collective action than others. When the evolved mechanisms of our
species-typical brain fall short in the modern environment, we depend on the
design of targeted institutions to fill the gap, and certain individuals are more
relevant to this task. Certainly, the identification of these relevant individuals is
not an easy task, but our recent simulations demonstrate that it is possible.52 The
sparse culling of only a few relationships can result in network effects that
spread reciprocal cooperation throughout the network.

has to be compacted together to keep the reaction from petering out . . . . The principle of critical
mass is so simple that it is no wonder that it shows up in epidemiology, fashion, survival and
extinction of species, language systems, racial integration, jaywalking, panic behavior, and political
movements.
SCHELLING, supra note 44, at 89. See generally GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE
CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION (1993).
50. A phase transition is an abrupt change in a system, as when water, upon reaching its boiling
point, suddenly becomes a vapor.
51. See figs. 4–6, infra pp. 78–80.
52. Id.
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Figure 4: A sparse culling severs only a few relationships, but results in
network effects that spread reciprocal cooperation throughout the network.
53
The lighter shades represent cooperating, reciprocating strategies. Conversely,
the addition of a single, targeted relationship can produce similar positive
effects.

53. For full-color illustrations and more-detailed supplemental material, see http://www.cncrnet.
org/nexus/yarnandjoneslcpsupplemental.pdf.
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Figure 5: A single targeted relationship is added resulting in network effects
that spread reciprocal cooperation throughout the network. The lighter shades
represent cooperating, reciprocating strategies.54
The timing of exogenous interventions is also critically important. The use
of sparse culling in a network that is not at equilibrium can result in extreme
fragmentation of the network. (See top panels of Figure 6). In contrast, an
identical sparse culling implemented after the network has reached a stable
equilibrium brings about the desired results while maintaining the overall
cohesiveness of the social network. (See bottom panels of Figure 6).

A

B

54. For full-color illustrations and more-detailed supplemental material, see http://www.cncrnet.
org/nexus/yarnandjoneslcpsupplemental.pdf.
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D

Figure 6: Timing of interventions counts for a lot. In the upper two panels
(A & B), sparse culling is employed before the network reaches equilibrium. In
the bottom two panels (C & D), the network is allowed to reach equilibrium
before sparse culling is employed. The lighter shades represent cooperating,
reciprocating strategies.55
Finally, these barriers related to social architecture are highly interrelated.
Properly designed institutions can help to overcome dynamics in characteristic
social structure and can identify opportunities in nonlinear participation effects.
But it should be clear that institutions improperly targeted or improperly timed,
even when well-intentioned, can bring about unanticipated phase transitions
that can produce unintended results.
VI
CONCLUSION
How is this relevant to truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs)?
Admittedly, evolutionary biology is a blunt tool with which to analyze the
complexities of intergroup conflict in modern human societies: it is reductionist
by definition. Yet the basic principles of human behavior derived from a
biological perspective offer some insight into what a TRC must do to overcome
resistance and actually achieve intergroup reconciliation. At the individual
level, TRCs must satisfy retaliatory urges, induce apology and forgiveness,
evoke emotional contagion, and build sufficient trust while reducing prejudice.
Much of the criticism directed at TRCs focuses on their inability to deliver

55. For full-color illustrations and more-detailed supplemental material, see http://www.cncrnet.org
/nexus/yarnandjoneslcpsupplemental.pdf.
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retributive justice. 56 Most TRCs cannot do so because they operate in
transitional societies in which the government is too weak or too dependent
upon still-powerful perpetrators to prosecute them. Without punishment, are
perpetrators’ testimonies and apologies, if any, sufficiently costly to be accepted
as a signal of trustworthiness or to induce forgiveness? To the extent apology
and forgiveness occur at the individual level through TRC proceedings, how
does that get transferred through emotional contagion to a societal or national
level? At the group level, TRCs must counteract negative social-architecture
effects, overcome disadvantageous degrees of integration, engage enough
people to reach critical mass, reduce the influence of negative relationships
while enhancing the influence of positive ones, and do it all at the right time.
It is unrealistic to expect this of a single institutional intervention.
Intergroup reconciliation in the wake of longstanding historic injustices is by
necessity a long and complex process of which a TRC is merely a step in that
direction. To the extent they are successful in overcoming some resistance to
reconciliation, TRCs may simply provide individuals with some sense of
belonging to a superordinate group with the former victimizers, 57 provide
opportunities to “get to know one another better” so as to reduce fear
conditioning,58 or provide enough common narrative of the past (“truth”) to
undermine the competing narratives necessary to support continued
adversarialism, thereby increasing the effectiveness of other reconciliatory
efforts. Indeed, TRCs rarely operate in isolation. As James Gibson points out in
this symposium, TRCs may be more the product of change than the cause of
it59—an observation that has evolutionary implications of its own. Usually, other
reconciliatory efforts are taking place at different societal levels. Presumably, if
enough individuals or the “right” individuals are positively affected, a
transformative critical mass will be reached that signals a breach in the
biological barriers to reconciliation.

56. For a summary of this criticism and citations to legal scholars voicing it, see Kevin Avruch &
Beatriz Vejarano, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: A Review Essay and Annotated Bibliography,
4 ONLINE J. PEACE & CONFLICT RESOLUTION 37, 38–39 (2002).
57. See Tom Tyler, Governing Pluralistic Societies, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187 (Spring 2009)
(discussing how procedural justice promotes superordinate-group identification to manage intergroup
conflict).
58. See Maroney, supra note 30, at 87–88. (suggesting that racial integration and increased contact
can reduce evolutionarily-driven fear conditioning)
59. James L. Gibson, On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of Truth Commissions, 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 124 (Spring 2009).

